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Английское морское и коммерческое право Английский прецедентЮридические услуги, консультации |
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ДЕЛО "THE MERCINI LADY 1"Дело, которое мы будем рассматривать, является довольно интересным, и неожиданным по своей истории принятия. Судовая партия газойля (жидкий груз), проданная на условиях ФОБ, была прекрасного качества, о чем говорил сертификат независимого сюрвейера. Этот сертификат был ФИНАЛЬНЫМ ПО ПОГРУЗКЕ, согласно контракту. Груз погрузили и отправили к месту доставки. В пути он был всего 4 дня. После того, как он прибыл в порт выгрузки (Испания) оказалось, что газойль не соответствует контрактным параметрам: осадок значительно «зашкаливал» за контрактные рамки. Получатели груза отказались от него, и покупатель вынужден был продать с большой скидкой третьему лицу и у него же купить другую партию газойля, отвечающую качественным запросам получателя, которым кстати выступало государственное учреждение. Что интересно, покупатель, которого представляли «боги» английского юридического сообщества Holman, Fenwick Willan, признал изначально, что груз был качественным в момент погрузки. Но, как утверждали покупатели, груз был поставлен в таком состоянии, которое не позволило ему сохранить свое качество в течение нормального рейса, а также в разумное время после окончания самого рейса. Это, уверяли покупатели, есть нарушение подразумеваемых условий, хоть и не содержащихся прямо в контракте, но зафиксированных в Законе о купле-продаже товаров 1979 года, а также в нормах английского Общего Права. Вопрос стоял не шуточный – на кону была судьба контрактов заключенных с качеством, установленным и финальным при погрузке. В первой инстанции суд признал правоту покупателей и согласился с тем, что хоть товар и был хорош при погрузке, и сопровождался он сертификатом качества, и в контракте была указана «финальность» качества в момента погрузки, но, по мнению суда, проданный груз должен обладать качествами , позволяющими ему «пережить» перевозку, грузовые операции и определенное «разумное время» после доставки в руки покупателя. Интересно, что юридическое сообщество приняло такое решение суда с неодобрением. Была критика в литературе и среди практиков-юристов. Хорошим примером такой реакции может служить статья , размещенная на сайте уважаемой юридической конторы Reed Smith LLP Разумеется, этот спор дошел до апелляционного суда (и мы приводим его упрощенный перевод и оригинальный текст самого решения). Лорды решили, что прав все же Продавец. Такое решение вызвало ликование в среде заинтересованных лиц. Возобладал английский консерватизм и любовь к стабильности и предсказуемости. Контракт предусматривал, что товар должен соответствовать качеству в момент погрузки. Таким было намерение сторон при заключении контракта. В Общем Праве нет подразумеваемых условий, на которые ссылался покупатель. Товар в момент поставки был нормальным. Продавец свои обязательства выполнил. Ответственность за то, что произошло после поставки, он нести не может и не будет. Решение лордов имеет еще несколько оснований и размышлений, которые изложены далее. Принцип финальности устоял. Дело вернули обратно в первую инстанцию для решения уже конкретных вопросов, с учетом мнения лордов. Однако, не все оказалось так просто. Покупатель решил обойти проблему в виде финального статуса товара при погрузке. Во втором слушании в суде первой инстанции Покупатель заявил, что товар, хотя и был признан качественным и соответствующим требованиям контракта, на самом деле находился в «нестабильном» состоянии, что не позволило достоверно определить его качество в момент погрузки. Нестабильность выявила нарушение качества по осадку только после отгрузки, когда судно уже пришло в порт выгрузки. Исходя из того, что рассматриваемый случай произошел с жидким грузом, судя по всему, Покупатель имел ввиду то, что газойль в момент отбора проб был во взвешенном состоянии, не позволяющем точно и объективно установить количество присутствующего осадка. Этот аргумент был принят судом. Решено, что товар был поставлен не соответствующего качества, а следовательно, формула «КАЧЕСТВО ФИНАЛЬНОЕ ПРИ ПОГРУЗКЕ» не применима к этому случаю. Тонкости рассуждений судьи пока не известны. Что суд думает насчет нормального сертификата качества, тоже пока не ясно. В нашем распоряжении имеется не сам текст решения, а его обзор. Решение появится позже. Серьезных аналитических комментариев в инете по поводу нового решения суда первой инстанции не наблюдается. А пока, мы начинаем разбор этого дела сразу с решения апелляционной инстанции. Помещенный в самом конце этой статьи текст на языке оригинала может повергнуть в уныние малоопытных юристов, однако, рекомендуем его просмотреть хотя бы поверхностно, чтобы иметь понятие, что такое судебный акт английского суда. Всего хорошего. АПЕЛЛЯЦИОННЫЙ СУД [2010] EWCA Civ 1145 Купля-продажа товара (фоб)- Контракт на продажу бензина – Товар соответствует спецификации в момент отгрузки, но не соответствует спецификации на выгрузке – Имеются ли подразумеваемые условия в контракте купли-продажи фоб, что товар будет удовлетворительного качества и будет соответствовать контрактным спецификациям после окончания обыкновенного рейса – Имеются ли в контракте прямо выраженные положения, исключающие подразумеваемые условия о качестве и спецификации – Закон о купле-продаже товаров 1979, статья 14 (2) Sale of Goods (fob) – Contract for sale of gasoil – Goods complying with specification on shipment but failing to comply at discharge – Whether term implied in fob sale that goods would still be of satisfactory quality and in accordance with contractual specification following a normal voyage –Whether express term of contract had effect to exclude implied conditions as to quality and specification – Sale of Goods Act 1979, section 14 (2) Согласно контракту от 9 января 2007 года ответчик продавец продал истцу покупателю 38 500 метрических тонн бензина подлежащего отгрузке на борту судна Мерсини Леди ФОБ Антверпен. Статья 4 контракта перечисляет различные спецификации, которые товар должен иметь при отгрузке, включая показатель по осадку. Контракт также устанавливал следующее: 7. ОТГРУЗКА ФОБ один безопасный порт / причал BRC Антверпен 12. КОЛИЧЕСТВО / КАЧЕСТВО 15. РИСК И ПРАВО СОБСТВЕННОСТИ ФОБ Антверпен 18. ДРУГИЕ УСЛОВИЯ Погрузка окончилась 17 января 2007 года и судно прибыло в порт назначения Эль Феррол, Испания, 21 января. Анализы композитных образцов отобранных перед погрузкой из береговых ёмкостей показали, что образцы соответствуют контрактным спецификациям, включая спецификацию по осадку. Покупатели заявили, что когда газойль прибыл в порт Эль Феррол после нормального рейса, он не соответствовал контрактным показателям по осадку и что получатели поэтому отказались от товара. Покупатели согласились с тем, что товар соответствовал спецификации в момент погрузки на судно. Они заявили, что товар изменил своё качество и параметры к моменту, когда он прибыл в Испанию и поэтому он «не был способен оставаться» в удовлетворительном качестве. Покупатели обратились в суд, требуя возмещения убытков превышающих 3 миллиона долларов. Они заявили, что продавцы нарушили подразумеваемые существенные условия по качеству, в соответствии с статьей 14(2) Закона о продаже товаров 1979 года, и / или нарушили подразумеваемые условия Общего Права в том, что газойль должен был, при отгрузке, быть в состоянии выдержать нормальный рейс, так , чтобы по прибытию к месту назначении, а также в течение разумного срока времени после этого, газойль все еще оставался удовлетворительного качества и /или соответствовал контрактным спецификациям. Продавцы отрицали, что имели место подразумеваемые условия применительно к статье 14(2) Закона 1979 года или к Общему Праву, которые позволяли бы расширительно толковать статью 4 контракта о качестве, содержащую спецификацию газойля, распространяющую бы свое действие за пределы точки погрузки товара, с тем чтобы иметь силу и в будущем времени (после погрузки на судно). Продавцы далее заявляли, что в любом случае, установленные законом подразумеваемые условия по удовлетворительному качеству и якобы существующие подразумеваемые условия в Общем Праве не должны применяться из-за имеющейся в контракте статьи 18. Покупатели заявили в ответ, что статья 18 не может применяться для исключения существенных условий подразумеваемых Законом (any conditions implied by law), поскольку слово «condition» не упомянуто в тексте статьи. Судья Филд ответил на предварительные вопросы в пользу покупателей. Он решил, что: Продавцы обратились с апелляцией. Они согласились с тем, что с учетом статьи 18, подразумеваемое условие об удовлетворительном качестве согласно статье 14 (2) Закона 1979 года обычно требует, чтобы газойль, доставленный в Антверпен, был в состоянии выдержать нормальный рейс, разумной длительности, как например в Испанию, с сохранением качественных параметров. Однако, они заявили о том, что нет в Общем Праве подразумеваемых условий, как это признано судьей, и что судья ошибся в своих выводах о том, что статья 18 не исключает действие подразумеваемых условий, на которых основывает свои требования истец. Решено Апелляционным Судом (Maurice Kay, Rix and Patten LJJ) удовлетворить апелляционную жалобу: (1) В Общем Праве отсутствуют подразумеваемые условия на которое ссылался покупатель. Контракт четко указывает на то, что товар должен соответствовать спецификации в момент поставки. В намерение сторон входила проверка газойля независимым инспектором до погрузки, на условиях «береговые ёмкости». Результат такого инспектирования должен быть окончательным. Осадок был в пределах спецификации в момент погрузки и поставки. Следовательно, поставленный газойль соответствовал спецификации. После поставки на покупателя перешли «все риски» (статья 15). «Все риски» включают риск перевозки, и риск нестабильности груза (risk of cargo instability). Статья о финальности результатов инспекции и проведении анализов в момент погрузки заменяет собой или устраняет использование подразумеваемых условий о качестве и не допускает их применение в будущем, в частности в отношении изменения в спецификации товара после его поставки. Более того, указанные условия не могут применяться из-за статьи 14 (1) Закона 1979 года, который ограничивает применение условий по качеству или соответствию законодательным положениям, содержащимся в Законе 1979 года… (2) Что же касается статьи 18 контракта, подразумеваемые обязательства , которые, по мнению продавцов, были исключены, были не только фундаментальные обязательства согласно Английскому праву, давно закрепленные в Законе о купле-продаже товаров , но в придачу к этому в юридическом сообществе сложилось мнение, что такие обязательства могут быть лишены силы, только путем прямого и ясного указания на «conditions». Суд не стал отходить от этого давно установившегося мнения. Соответственно, условия, подразумеваемые в контракте согласно статье 14 (2) Закона 1979 года, не были исключены положениями статьи 18 … _________________________ Следующие дела были использованы в судебном решении: Alfred C Toepfer v Continental Grain Co (CA) [1974] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 11; Nigel Jacobs Королевский Адвокат проинструктированный юридической конторой Davies Johnson& Co представлял интересы продавца. Philip Edey Королевский Адвокат проинструктированный юридической фирмой Holman, Fenwick Willan LLP представлял интересы покупателя… JUDGMENT Lord Justice RIX: 1. This appeal raises two short points of some importance in the area of sale of goods law. The first questions the judge’s implication of what even the respondent accepts is a novel term. The second questions long-established and high authority to the effect that if a seller wishes to exclude Sale of Goods Act conditions, he must do so by express exclusion of “conditions”. 2. By a contract dated 9 January 2007 Petroplus Marketing AG of Zug, Switzerland, (the “seller”) sold to KG Bominflot of Hamburg, Germany, (the “buyer”) 38,500 mt gasoil 10 per cent +/ in buyer’s option fob Antwerp free destination, for shipment during 13 to 15 January 2007, at a price to be determined by IPE February 2007 gasoil less a stipulated discount (the “contract”). The contract was governed by English law. The buyer is the claimant in these proceedings and in this court the respondent. The seller is the defendant and here the appellant. 3. There was a specification clause (clause 4), headed “Quality”, which governed a dozen or so properties of the gasoil, including “Total sediment”. That was to have a maximum of 10 mg/litre as tested by a specified test, viz D-2709/88. Quality and quantity were to be determined by independent inspection at loading which was to be final and binding for both parties, save for fraud or manifest error (clause 12). Risk and title were to pass on loading (clause 15). Clause 18 (“Other Conditions”) contained a number of terms but also an exclusion clause which is central to the issues before us, as follows: “There are no guarantees, warranties or representations, express or implied, or [sic, sc of] merchantability, fitness or suitability of the oil for any particular purpose or otherwise which extend beyond the description of the oil set forth in this agreement.” 4. This appeal arises out of preliminary issues and so there are no findings of fact. I take the following matters from the buyer’s particulars of claim. 6. The gasoil was inspected at Antwerp prior to loading by an inspector from SGS. A composite sample was made up from the five shoretanks from which the gasoil was taken. The results were recorded in a Certificate of Analysis. The sediment was recorded at 6.4 mg/litre according to test method EN 12662. That was not the contractual test method. Although the particulars of claim do not say so, the loading determination found the gasoil to be within specification. 8. The goods were rejected by the receivers as being off-specification. 9. The claim is for over US$3 million, made up of damages for the difference in value of the cargo, freight, demurrage and other consequential losses. 10. The defence referred to the final and binding certification of SGS at loading and clause 4 of the contract so as to submit that any other and later tests were irrelevant. It also pleaded that the loading test was the best evidence of the condition of the cargo on loading. 11. In its reply the buyer admitted that the fact that the cargo was off-spec as to sediment when tested for the purposes of its on-sale at El Ferrol did not establish that the cargo was off-spec when the cargo was shipped at Antwerp; and also specifically stated that it “does not allege that the cargo was off-spec for the purposes of the Sale Contract when the cargo was shipped on board the Vessel”. Rather, its case was “as set out in paragraph 13” of its particulars of claim, viz that there was a breach of implied terms that the goods were “capable of remaining” during the voyage and for a reasonable time thereafter of satisfactory quality and/or on-spec. 13. It seems to me therefore that in the light of the buyer’s admission as to the gasoil’s compliance with specification at the time of loading, all factual questions relating to the loading port inspection and certification appear to be irrelevant. That is in all probability why the buyer has not sought to rely on the clause 4 exception of fraud or manifest error (I do not mean to suggest that there has been either), 14. What are the implied terms relied on by the buyer? As pleaded they are as follows: (1) the implied term of satisfactory quality under section 14(2) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 (“the 1979 Act”), one aspect of which was the gasoil’s durability (section 14(2B)(e)); (2) the implied term under section 14(3) of the 1979 Act that the gasoil would be reasonably fit for the purpose of remaining, during its time on the vessel and for a reasonable time thereafter, within the contract specifications; and (3) an implied term at common law that the gasoil would be capable of enduring a reasonable voyage and for a reasonable time thereafter so that it would still then be of satisfactory quality and/or in accordance with contractual specification. 15. Therefore the express terms of the contract are relied on by the buyer only in so far as the specification as to sediment is brought into any of those implied terms as reflecting satisfactory quality, fitness for purpose or what I might call the capability of the gasoil of meeting its specification into the future. 17. The factual premises of these elusive submissions are nowhere made apparent. The suggestion is that even such a product as gasoil may be unstable such that it may be within specification as to sediment at one moment and out of specification at the next. That, however, is not what is expressly said in the buyer’s particulars of claim. On the contrary, the various tests, after shipment, on both the cargo on arrival in Spain and on retained loading samples, which are pleaded in the particulars of claim, all 18. On behalf of the buyer, Mr Philip Edey QC has moreover made it completely clear to us that he does not rely on his implied terms as amounting to continuing warranties as to the quality, fitness, or specification of the gasoil. He acknowledges that any such term has to be what he described as a “fixed point” warranty, ie a warranty that is to be tested only at the fixed point of delivery (on loading). Where durability is concerned, the distinction might be put in terms of the difference between a continuing and a prospective warranty. A continuing warranty extends into the future and would guarantee the condition of goods after delivery. I suppose an example of such a warranty is the typical warranty originating with a manufacturer or a dealer provided on the sale of consumer goods, which promises repair or replacement if the goods are found to be defective at any time within a stated period after purchase. What matters is the manifestation of a later defect (subject to exceptions relating to the buyer’s misuse) within the stated period, not the condition of the goods on delivery. A prospective warranty however relates only to the time of delivery, but looks prospectively into the future and asks whether the goods, as at the time of delivery, were in the condition which the buyer was entitled to expect under his contract. Typical warranties of such a kind are the implied statutory conditions of satisfactory quality and reasonable fitness for purpose. The former used to be called a condition of merchantable quality. 20. There has been some controversy as to whether Diplock J was speaking of a continuing warranty, and it is true that some formulations in his judgment are potentially ambiguous, as for instance at page 870: “these goods being bought c&f Liverpool, the warranty as to merchantability was a warranty that they should remain merchantable for a reasonable time, the time reasonable in the circumstances, which means a time for the normal transit to the destination, and for disposal after”. Similarly, in Ollett v Jordan [1918] 2 KB 41, cited by Diplock J at page 868, Atkin J had said at page 47: 21. In the present case, it is agreed by both parties that the implied condition of satisfactory quality applies only at the time of delivery, and is a fixed point or prospective warranty only, and not a continuing one, and that that is how Mash & Murrell is to be understood. They are agreed, and for these purposes what is particularly important is that Mr Edey on behalf of the buyer agrees, that to the extent that the judge below, Field J, may have suggested in his judgment by any of his formulations that the relevant implied warranty is a continuing one, he is not to be so understood. On this basis, Mr Nigel Jacobs QC, on behalf of the seller, is content to accept that the implied statutory condition of satisfactory quality under what is now section 14(2) of the 1979 Act would ordinarily require the capability of the gasoil delivered at Antwerp to withstand a normal voyage of reasonable duration such as that to Spain with its satisfactory quality intact. But for the exception in clause 18, therefore, Mr Jacobs would have accepted the section 14(2) implication of satisfactory quality as requiring some concept of durable quality, such that evidence of unsatisfactory quality on arrival in Spain could be used as evidence from which to attempt to draw the inference that the goods were not of satisfactory quality upon loading. 22. In these circumstances it has been unnecessary to delve into any of the controversies which surround Mash & Murrell and the extent to which its doctrine extends to fob voyages (see Navigas Ltd of Gibraltar v Enron Liquid Fuels Inc (22 May 1998, unreported, Colman J) or beyond perishable goods. For the same reason it has become unnecessary to visit much of the analysis of Field J. Indeed, neither counsel before us has cited Mash & Murrell to us at the hearing (save, incidentally, on issue 2 at paras 46ff below). 23. What remains are two issues. The first issue is whether, in addition to the statutory implied term of satisfactory quality, as so accepted, there is to be implied a further term, at common law, extending the quality clause 4, containing the gasoil’s specification, beyond the point of loading so as to reach prospectively into the future. The former implied term has been called the “basic” statutory implied term; the latter has been called the “special” or “additional” common law implied term. The expression of that latter term nevertheless remains elusive. As expressed in the particulars of claim it is that: “the goods would, on delivery under the sale contract, be capable of enduring a normal voyage As expressed by the judge, accepting that submission on the part of the buyer, the term is that: “if the seller has bound himself to supply goods of a particular specification, I think it plain that in the absence of any inconsistent term he is to be taken to have agreed that the goods should remain on specification for a reasonable time after delivery.” 24. I have called the term elusive, for, although Mr Edey expressly eschews any continuing warranty, the effect of his clause is stated to be that there will be a breach of contract (and not merely evidence of a possible breach of contract) where the gasoil is not still in specification upon arrival at destination and for a reasonable time thereafter. That indeed is a necessary corollary of his pleading, emphasised at the hearing, that the buyer does not allege that the gasoil was out of specification at the time of loading. The gasoil was, or may have been, merely unsatisfactory in that it was unstable and might therefore become, and in the event was, out of specification at the time of arrival. This is again the inference to be derived from a section of Mr Edey’s skeleton for this appeal, where he explains the significance of this point as follows: This passage suggests that the additional implied term would, on the tests made on arrival, be decisive of the result of the buyer’s claim. But in that case, the term is sought in effect to be used as a continuing warranty, even while the buyer eschews that ambition. 25. I am therefore sceptical of Mr Edey’s analysis, and he has admitted that such a special, non-statutory implied term as he seeks, is novel. Although, because the wrong test was used, the SGS certificate is not final and binding as to sediment quality, Mr Edey nevertheless accepts, as though he had such a final and binding certificate against him, that the gasoil was within specification 26. Be that as it may, I will examine the argument further, in accordance with the submissions made to the court. 27. The first issue argued in this court therefore was whether the judge was right to hold that the so-called specific or additional implied term was part of the contract. The second issue was whether either the basic or the specific implied term could withstand the exclusion to be found within clause 18. Before I return to these issues it will be necessary to set out the relevant terms of the contract, some parts of the 1979 Act, and the preliminary issues ordered. The contract 28. The contract provided as follows: “3. PRODUCT Gasoil, 1 pct gasoil Ex BRC Antwerp, EU qualified 4. QUALITY Following quality to apply: Total sediment mg/l D-2709/88 7. SHIPMENT FOB one safe port/berth BRC Antwerp 8. DESTINATION Free destination If destination is EU, buyer will communicate to seller his VAT registration number 12. QUANTITY/QUALITY 15. RISK AND TITLE FOB Antwerp Each delivery shall be completed and title shall vest absolutely in buyer when the product passes the vessel’s permanent hose connection at the port of loading at which time buyer assumes all risks pertaining thereto. 18. OTHER CONDITIONS INCO Terms 2000 plus latest amendments There are no guarantees, warranties or misrepresentations, express or implied, [of] merchantability, fitness or suitability of the oil for any particular purpose or otherwise which extend beyond the description of the oil set forth in this agreement. Buyers further warrant that The buyer warrants that Buyer guarantees that Buyers guarantee that Buyers warrant, represent and undertake that It is a condition of this agreement that buyer complies with its obligations under this clause. In the event that buyer is in breach of any of the provisions of this clause in whole or part, seller shall be entitled to terminate this agreement immediately “ The 1979 Act 29. The 1979 Act provides: “11. When condition to be treated as a warranty. (3) Whether a stipulation in a contract is a condition, the breach of which may give rise to a right to treat the contract as repudiated, or a warranty, the breach of which may give rise to a claim for damages but not a right to reject the goods and treat the contract as repudiated, depends in each case on the construction of the contract; and a stipulation may be a condition, though called a warranty in the contract 14. Implied terms about quality or fitness. (1) Except as provided by this section and section 15 below and subject to any other enactment, there is no implied term about the quality or fitness for any particular purpose of goods supplied under a contract of sale. (2) Where the seller sells goods in the course of a business, there is an implied term that the goods supplied under the contract are of satisfactory quality. (2B) For the purposes of this Act, the quality of goods includes their state and condition and the following (among others) are in appropriate cases aspects of the quality of goods: (a) fitness for all the purposes for which goods of the kind are commonly supplied, (b) appearance and finish, © freedom from minor defects, (e) durability (4) An implied term about quality or fitness for a particular purpose may be annexed to a contract of sale by usage (6) As regards England and Wales and Northern Ireland, the terms implied by subsection (2) and (3) above are conditions.” The preliminary issues 30. On 23 October 2008 by consent the following four preliminary issues were ordered to be tried: (1) Was there an implied term of the sale contract, pursuant to section 14(2) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 and/or at common law that the goods would, on delivery under the sale contract, be capable of enduring a normal voyage such that upon arrival at their destination following such a normal journey (and for a reasonable time thereafter) they would be still be of satisfactory quality and/or in accordance with the contractual specification? (2) On the assumption the defendants knew from the terms of the sale contract that the goods were to be carried on Mercini Lady or substitute, was it an implied condition of the sale contract, pursuant to section 14(3) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979, that the goods would, on delivery under the sale contract, be reasonably fit for the purpose of remaining, during their time on the vessel and for a reasonable time thereafter, within the specifications set out in the sale contract? (3) Were the defendants’ obligations under the Sale of Goods Act 1979 under section 14(2) and/or at common law limited to the supply of goods which complied with their contractual specification upon shipment fob Antwerp? The judge’s judgment 31. The judge answered these four preliminary questions as follows: (1) No, but there was an obligation on the seller under section 14(2) of the 1979 Act and at common law to deliver gasoil that was of satisfactory quality not only when the cargo was delivered on to the vessel but also for a reasonable time thereafter. In addition, under the term implied at common law, the gasoil had to remain in accordance with the contractual specification after delivery on the vessel for a reasonable period. (2) No. (3) No. (4) Clause 18 does not preclude the 32. Thus the judge essentially answered question (1) Yes, but put his answer in the way he did because he wished to be cautious, in the context of an fob sale with a free destination, about phrasing the implied term by reference to a “normal voyage”. For present purposes that does not matter. It is not suggested that the relatively short voyage to Spain was other than completed within a reasonable time of delivery at Antwerp. The judge’s answer to question (1) covered both the section 14(2) basic term and the common law additional special term relating to the contractual specification. His ultimate formulation of the special term (“had to remain in accordance with the contractual specification after delivery on the vessel for a reasonable period”) is not relied on by the buyer as going beyond a prospective, fixed point, warranty. This answer to question (1) is therefore the subject matter of the seller’s first ground of appeal: but the seller only appeals against the special common law term, not (subject to clause 18) the basic statutory implied term or the meaning, as stipulated between the parties in this court, to be ascribed to it. 33. The judge’s answer to question (2) does not concern us. There is no cross-appeal on question (2). 34. The judge’s answers to questions (3) and (4) have to be considered together. The answer that the seller would give to both is “Yes”, and that is because of clause 18. But for clause 18, however, the seller would accept that the section 14(2) implied term went beyond compliance with the contractual specification under clause 4 of the contract. 36. By a respondent’s notice the buyer also submits that, even if the contract only contained the basic section 14(2) implied term, that would be enough at trial to answer the case conclusively in its favour (“its claim must succeed”), inter alia because that term would require the gasoil to meet the contractual specification on arrival, which it did not. We did not hear much about the respondent’s notice on the appeal hearing. It seems to me that such a submission could not succeed. It would take evidence to show that the section 14(2) implied term: (a) required a maximum sediment content of 10 mg/litre on the specified test (which as far as I can see has never been used); or (b) was broken by reason of a sediment content as found on arrival; and © in either event that the reason for the sediment content on arrival was the inherent instability of the cargo on loading. None of these propositions are self-evident. The fact that the buyer seeks to Issue 1: the additional or special term implied at common law 37. The judge seems to have derived this additional implied term simply as an extension of the statutory implied term of satisfactory quality as interpreted in Mash & Murrell (in relation to the predecessor implied term of merchantable quality). As quoted above (at para 23) the judge asserted that the common law implied term was “plain” in the absence of any inconsistent term. As to the question of inconsistency, he rejected any inconsistency derived from clause 18 (but that is the subject matter of issue 2), but also as derived from clause 12. As to clause 12, he said that the “specification does not require the gasoil to be otherwise than on spec at the point of delivery” (at para 44). I would have thought that that prima facie was an inconsistency. 38. On behalf of the seller, Mr Jacobs submitted that the implied term was: (i) inconsistent with the express terms of the contract, in particular clauses 4 and/or 12 and 15; and (ii) unnecessary in the light of the basic statutory implied condition. On behalf of the buyer, Mr Edey submitted to the opposite effect. 40. On the contrary, the contract makes it clear that the specification has to be met at the time of delivery, that the intention is that the gasoil should be inspected by an independent inspector prior to loading, “basis shoretank” (ie not even on the basis of the gasoil in the ship’s tanks), and that the inspector’s determination should be conclusive (ie final and binding in the absence of fraud or manifest error). It is accepted that, even though the gasoil’s 42. It would follow that it is impossible, without knowing at least something more about the circumstances in which it is alleged that the sediment specification of the gasoil changed, to say whether the statutory section 14(2) implication, which, subject to the second issue, the seller would accept, would assist the buyer. If the truth is that there was just an error in testing for sediment, and there has been no change in the nature of the gasoil, then, on the structure of the argument as it exists at present, the buyer could not succeed. The gasoil may have been out of specification at loading, but the buyer has accepted that it was in specification. If the 44. In the circumstances it would be superfluous to discuss whether or not the additional implied term was necessary or not in the light of the acceptance of the section 14(2) term. It could certainly go further than the statutory term, which is not focused on this contract’s specification in particular, but more generally on the considerations set out in section 14(2A) and (2B). Therefore, contrary to the submission of Mr Jacobs, the presence of the statutory implied term would not render the additional 45. Finally, although it was not a point made at the hearing, it is hard to see how the alleged additional term can survive section 14(1) of the 1979 Act. That provision, which limits the implication of terms about quality or fitness to the statutory terms contained in the 1979 Act, thus retains, in the background, the most fundamental rule of all so far as quality is concerned, namely that, despite the huge inroads made by first the common law and then statute, the underlying principle is still caveat emptor, let the buyer beware. 46. For the sake of convenience, I repeat the relevant part (it is a small part) of clause 18: “There are no guarantees, warranties or representations, express or implied, [of] merchantability, fitness or suitability of the oil for any particular purpose or otherwise, which extend beyond the description of the oil set forth in this agreement.” 47. On behalf of the buyer, Mr Edey, supported by the decision of the judge, relied on a well-known line of cases which state in effect that the Sale of Goods Act implied conditions cannot be excluded without express reference to the exclusion of “conditions”. Exclusion of guarantees, warranties or representations do not suffice. On behalf of the seller, Mr Jacobs, however, submitted that time has moved on since those cases were decided and that the attitude to the construction of exception clauses, particularly as between commercial parties, has 48. The well-known cases are as follows. The leading decision is that of the House of Lords in Wallis, Son & Wells v Pratt & Haynes [1911] AC 394. The House there approved the dissenting judgment of Fletcher Moulton LJ in this court, [1910] 2 KB 1003. The case concerned the sale of common English sainfoin. The clause there stated: “Sellers give no warranty express or implied as to growth, description or any other matters “ The goods delivered were not common English sainfoin but giant sainfoin, a different and inferior kind of seed. The breach was only discovered after the seed had been sold on and planted and the crop had materialised. Therefore there was no claim for rejection for breach of condition, but only for damages for breach of warranty. The case concerned however a breach of the express term of the description of the goods. If the exclusion had been held to operate in favour of the sellers, there could have been no breach of contract even though the sellers had delivered a different article from that which they had agreed to sell. It is not entirely clear whether such an exclusion can thus remove the foundation of a contract (see Pinnock Bros v Lewis and Peat Ltd [1923] 1 KB 690 and the discussion in Chitty on Contracts, 30th Edition, 2008, volume I, at para 14-027), but in any event it was the perfect case in which to consider scrupulously whether the exclusion clause could be narrowed. For the sellers it was argued that the words “no warranty” included every term in the contract (see at page 1011 in the majority judgment of Vaughan Williams LJ, where that argument is accepted) and that in any event the subject matter of the claim had become a breach of warranty and not of condition. For the buyers it was argued that a disavowal of warranties was not a disavowal of conditions, the difference between them being so well-known in the Sale of Goods Act, then of 1893. The buyers’ argument was defeated by a majority in this court, but prevailed in the House of Lords. “It is admitted that the language of the contract creates the obligation to deliver common English sainfoin and that this has the status of a condition. It cannot therefore be affected or limited by a clause which only negatives the existence of warranties “ 50. In the House of Lords, Fletcher Moulton LJ’s judgment was approved. Lord Loreburn LC said (at pages 395 and 396): “ the buyer may treat the breach of a condition as if it were a breach of warranty Lord Alverstone CJ said (at pages 398 and 399): “ it is quite impossible to suggest that in the year 1906, when these parties made a contract whereby they required that the goods should be common English sainfoin, and the sellers put in a stipulation that they would not give any warranty, express or implied, it was intended that it was always to be understood that they were not making themselves liable in regard to any condition as to the goods or for the consequences of a breach of the condition Within the four corners of this statute applicable to this contract we see this plain distinction between condition’ and warranty’” Lord Shaw of Dunfermline said (at pages 399 and 400): “My Lords, I do not think that these two commercial men meant warranty’ in a sense of any greater refinement than the breadth of the definition in the Sale of Goods Act it is as plain as language can make it that there are two things that are dealt with under different categories. The one is warranty’ and the other is condition’ “ 51. In Baldry v Marshall [1925] 1 KB 260 the sale was of a “Bugatti car” on terms that “Guarantee the same as received by us from the manufacturers”. The manufacturers’ guarantee guaranteed against defects for 12 months but “expressly excludes any other guarantee or warranty, statutory or otherwise”. The buyer complained that the car was uncomfortable and unsuited for touring and that this amounted to a breach of the statutory fitness for purpose implied condition. It was held, applying Wallis v Pratt, that the exclusion did not oust conditions. It was submitted that “any other guarantee” included conditions. Atkin LJ, unsuccessful leading counsel in Wallis v Pratt in the House of Lords, rejected that argument. He said (at page 269): “It said nothing about conditions’, and I do not think that the words any other guarantee’ can be read as meaning any other condition’, merely because they are used in addition to the word warranty’. In those circumstances the reasoning of the House of Lords in Wallis v Pratt applies to the present case.” 52. In Cammell Laird and Co Ltd v Manganese Bronze and Brass Co Ltd [1934] AC 402 the sale was of two ship’s propellers, which, although made to specification and design drawings, were unfit for their purpose. The guarantee clause merely stated “in which case it was held that though the statutory conditions may be excluded or varied by the express agreement of the parties, yet such a clause as this, in which the word condition is not used, is ineffective to exclude the conditions implied under the Act. The same principle was applied in Baldry v Marshall. The principle of these authorities is that though a condition is deemed to be and can be treated as a warranty, if it is not availed of to reject the goods, still it remains a condition; once a condition always a condition: hence apt and precise words must be used to exclude it: the words guarantee or warranty are not sufficiently clear.” 53. Thus by the time of Cammell Laird the question of construction had become a “principle”. Moreover in Henry Kendall & Sons v William Lillico & Sons Ltd (The Hardwick Game Farm Case) [1969] 2 AC 31, that principle was applied to a clause which was closer to the language of our clause 18, in that it referred explicitly to the statutory concept of merchantability, thus: “not warranted free from defect, rendering same unmerchantable, which would not be apparent on reasonable examination, any statute or rule of law to the contrary notwithstanding”. Lord Morris, citing the above authorities, said (at page 96A): “The words in clause 10 are wholly inapt to exclude a condition of the contract. They do not refer to a condition. You do not exclude a condition by excluding or purporting to exclude a warranty”. To similar effect were Lord Guest (at page 107D) and Lord Pearce (at page 114C to E). 55. Descending from general principle to the wording of clause 18 itself, Mr Jacobs submits that the reference in it to “merchantability, fitness or suitability of the oil for any particular purpose” is a clear, if so far as merchantability is concerned old-fashioned, reference to the statutory Sale of Goods Act implied terms; that the word “guarantees” is a strong and emphatic word, indicative even if not conclusively so of terms which may amount to conditions themselves (see B S & N Ltd (BVI) v Micado Shipping Ltd (Malta) (The Seaflower) [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 341 at paras 54, 61 and 102(6)); that clause 18 itself uses “condition” in two senses: first in the sense of merely any “terms” as in the title to clause 18 “Other conditions”, and secondly in the sense of a fundamental term breach of which entitles the innocent party to bring the contract to an end, as where in the last paragraph of clause 18 it is said to be “a condition of this agreement that buyer complies with its obligations under this clause”, so that, especially in a clause which refers to many of those buyer’s obligations in terms of what the buyer “warrants” or “guarantees”, it is mere pedantry to demand that the general reference to “no guarantees, warranties or representations” must also include a reference to “conditions” in order to exclude the 1979 Act’s implied conditions; and that section 14 itself describes the implications by the expression “implied term” (albeit section 14(6) also says the “terms” are “conditions” in England). It may be observed that even Lord Diplock has referred to the Mash & Murrell implication, which on my understanding, is part of the meaning to be attached to what is now the section 14(2) implied condition, as a “warranty” (at page 870). He similarly used the expression “warranty” to describe Sale of Goods Act conditions in Lambert v Lewis [1982] AC 225 at pages 273 and 276. 57. The judge accepted Mr Edey’s submissions, as relating both to the basic statutory and also the additional common law implied terms. He regarded the latter as also a condition of the contract. 58. In a recent case comment on the judge’s decision (Of fob sales, seller’s obligations and disclaimers [2009] LMCLQ 417 at page 420) Professor Andrew Tettenborn has suggested that Wallis v Pratt is now dated and that “English commercial law would, it is suggested, benefit greatly” if the new trend for the interpretation of exclusion clauses ushered in by Photo Production Ltd v Securicor were taken to heart. I note that Benjamin’s Sale of Goods, 8th Edition, 2010 refers to the jurisprudence as “very strict” (at para 13-025). 59. It is not easy to choose between these submissions. On the one hand a principle has been established, on the highest authority, that Sale of Goods Act implied conditions cannot be excluded by reference to guarantees or warranties and require clearer language extending to “conditions” themselves. Those authorities go beyond the relatively simple clause and stark facts of Wallis v Pratt itself, where there was a breach of an express clause as to the product to be supplied, or the case of Cammell Laird, where there was no exclusion at all, and extend to Baldry v Marshall, where the clause spoke expressly of the exclusion of “any other guarantee or warranty, statutory or otherwise”, and above all to Kendall v Lillico, where the clause was similar to ours in dealing expressly with the concept of merchantability and went on to refer expressly to “any statute or rule of law to the contrary notwithstanding” (emphasis added). 61. If therefore I were construing this clause untrammelled by past authority, or if such authority was plainly limited, in the way that so many decisions on the construction of individual clauses are limited, by considerations of the precise language and context of those particular clauses, I would feel it open, in the modern world, to give to clause 18 the construction which I believe that it realistically bears: that is to say, that “guarantees” and “warranties” are intended to cover all terms, both those which entitle the innocent party in the case of breach to treat the contract as repudiated and those which sound only in damages. As section 11(3) of the 1979 Act itself records, “a stipulation may be a condition, though called a warranty in the contract”: and clause 18 itself demonstrates that buyer’s warranties there set out are treated by the contract as conditions. It might be said that what is good enough for Lord Diplock (see at para 55 above) is good enough for commercial traders. However, I am not so free. The jurisprudence extends beyond individual decisions and has become expressive of a principle, and what is more the principle also encompasses clauses very similar to clause 18. I must consider that the parties to this English law contract, foreign as both of them are and quite possibly ignorant of the consequences of their choice of language, intended to contract by reference to what English law had to say about the language which they have adopted. As Lord Diplock said in Photo Production Ltd v Securicor itself (at pages 850G to 851A): “Since the presumption is that the parties by entering into the contract intended to accept the implied obligations exclusion clauses are to be construed strictly and the degree of strictness appropriate to be applied to their construction may properly depend upon the extent to which they involve departure from the implied obligations. Since the obligations implied by law in a commercial contract are those which, by judicial 62. In the present case, it is not a question of whether the exclusion is unreasonable or not. Either submission of the parties would be perfectly acceptable as long as the position was clear. It is, however, a case where the implied obligations which it is said on behalf of the seller have been excluded are not only fundamental obligations of English law, long enshrined in our Sale of Goods Acts, but there has also been a judicial consensus that such obligations can only be excluded by language which expressly (or perhaps one may add which must necessarily be taken to) refer to conditions: and that such language as has been used in our case falls within that consensus and principle. Lord Diplock was speaking of a judicial consensus which creates implied obligations: but there may also be a judicial consensus which preserves such implied obligations in the face of inadequate exclusions. In such circumstances, there is an importance in the certainty of our commercial law which goes beyond the answer that may be given in a particular case. I cannot say, against the background of the jurisprudence, that the parties’ language is fairly susceptible of only one meaning. Whereas I have sympathy for Professor Tennenborn’s position, and for the submissions of Mr Jacobs, I do not think that it is open to this court to depart from that long-established consensus. 63. In sum: (i) the alleged special or additional common law implied term which would put the seller in breach where goods of the contractual specification have been delivered but where there is subsequently (for an unspecified reason) a change such that the goods fall outside specification cannot be implied in this contract, even if the reason for that change were to be that the goods were not 64. In terms of the preliminary issues ordered, I would answer them therefore as follows: (1) The implied condition under section 14(2) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 is accepted by the seller, subject to the clause 18 exclusion. It is also accepted by the seller that in principle such an implied condition could be broken if the goods delivered should on delivery be in such a condition that it could not then be said to be of satisfactory quality, even though evidence of such a breach did not manifest itself until the end of the voyage (where it is also accepted that the voyage did not exceed a reasonable time). However, the special or additional alleged common law implied term is not to be implied into the contract. (3) and (4). No: first, because it is accepted that the section 14(2) statutory condition is prima facie to be implied, and secondly because that implied condition is not excluded by clause 18. However, how any reformulated allegation of breach in relation to the gasoil’s sediment fares in relation to clauses 4 and 12 and/or the facts remains to be seen. 65. I am on the whole doubtful that these preliminary issues have been a successful venture. Without a proper understanding of the nature of the buyer’s complaint about the oil, the argument, at any rate on issue 1, has become unsatisfactorily speculative and theoretical. It may be, however, that the buyer’s real purpose was to establish whether it could, by legal argument on these preliminary issues alone, achieve a position where a factual trial was unnecessary. As Mr Edey said in his skeleton, he sought a “shortcut”. If so, the shortcut is not there. Lord Justice PATTEN: 66. I agree. Lord Justice MAURICE KAY: 67. I also agree. Опубликовано: 11.12.2012 |
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© Адвокат Геннадий Логинов LLM |